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This article surveys the extent to which service doctrines as well as the 
Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces (JDIAS) capture and 
define the role of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the Indian military. 
The analysis captures the limited view and non-existent view of AI 
within service and tri-service doctrine. A gap has emerged between the 
services’ doctrinal pronouncements and the actual use of AI in some 
form in the three branches of the military. AI come in two variants 
at least—semi-autonomous and autonomous systems. This ensuing 
assessment is only a partial critique of how service doctrine see or ignore 
AI, the problem relating to the use of technology and doctrine is not 
unique to the services, but extends to other areas. 
Introduction
What is the extent of Artificial Intelligence’s role in the Indian Armed 
Services? As an emerging tec nol gy AI has assumed considerable 
significance in recent years for armed services across the world. The 
Indian armed services are integrating AI or AI-driven technologies 
before making any doctrinal shift or at a minimum doctrinal change has 
only partly paralleled the effort to adopt AI-related technologies and 
platforms. Indeed, individual service doctrines do not do justice to the 
extent to which AI-related technologies have already been integrated 
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into each service. Where AI features in service doctrine, it is treated 
as a key aspiration for future military capabilities. AI is a future goal, 
rather than a capability, which actually exists in some form. This analysis 
explores why this is the case with the three service branches of the Indian 
military. It draws on open source material and existing service doctrines 
and tracks the evolution of AI-related capabilities despite the absence of 
a visible doctrinal articulation of AI’s growing significance. AI, like all 
technologies, represents both continuity and discontinuity or change as 
far as the Indian armed services are concerned. One way to distinguish 
between autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons is by way of how 
these weapons relate to humans. The latter set of weapons such as the US-
built Predator drones can fly autonomously to some point on the planet 
or a destination, but the release of their lethal ordinance against a target 
is entirely in the control of their human operator.1 On the other hand, the 
former set of weapons system consisting of automated weapons systems 
encompasses lethality and destructiveness such as the Israeli Iron Dome 
missile defence system.2 This system can fire without human intervention 
and pre-programmed to identify and destroy incoming missiles.3 
As will be demonstrated below India’s service-specific doctrines do 
not capture these distinctions and do not address fully the importance of 
AI and nor does the tri-service doctrine or Joint Doctrine of the Indian 
Armed Services of the Indian military address how AI might be relevant 
to military operations and missions. Any doctrinal engagement with AI 
is at best uneven in that either as an emer ing technology its possibilities 
excessively exaggerated or inadequately appraised. AI is yet to fully mature 
and is still evolving. Indeed, it is an “emerging technology”, which by 
definition means it is undergoing an “evolutionary” process, rather 
than a “revolutionary” process. Indeed, the very dictionary definition 
of the word “emerging” means “gradual appearance”.4 At best one may 
extend the meaning to include something that appeared ‘unexpectedly’. 
Regardless, something that appears unexpectedly is not the same as being 
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‘revolutionary’. AI has not arrived unexpectedly, however, the possibilities 
that AI can accomplish today in the defence domain has grown. The only 
‘revolutionary’ technology if there has ever been is nuclear technology 
both in the form of civilian and military applications. 
Given this background, this analysis proceeds in three parts. First, it 
surveys what semi-AI technologies or systems the India Army (IA) has 
integrated. The second and third sections do the same for the Indian Air 
Force (IAF) and the Indian Navy (IN). And based on the assessment it 
provides some reasons as to why doctrinal change has not kept with the 
integration of AI into the armed services order of battle. 
Defining Doctrine and Where do the Armed Services’ 
Doctrines Stand on AI
Doctrine can be defined as a “belief system” that enshrines for the military 
an institutional mechanism through which a military seeks to fight.5 
Doctrine is based on an institutional construct and expression of guiding 
principles for the military. Guiding doctrinal principles do not necessarily 
reflect what needs to be done in specific situations where operational 
flexibility and not doctrinal rigidity are the key to military success.6 The 
purpose of doctrine is to educate military personnel about warfighting 
principles and enunciate them. There are three distinct types of doctrine: 
fundamental doctrine, operational doctrine and technological doctrine. 
The doctrine generally is insensitive or displays imperviousness 
to technological change or sees change as an aspirational aim. This is 
especially true of fundamental military doctrine which can be framed 
in very abstract terms. After all, fundamental doctrine as the Indian Air 
Force doctrine from two and half decades stated: “[A] … character is that 
fundamental doctrine is relatively insensitive to political philosophy and 
technological change”.7
This statement is valid as far as fundamental doctrine goes. However, 
contemporaneous operational doctrines also tend to mirror fundamental 












doctrine. The point to underline here is: why doctrinal articulations of 
the Indian armed services have not consistently captured technological 
change and capabilities integrated into the Indian armed services. The 
purpose of this analysis is to test this claim that doctrines of the Indian 
armed services are not in complete alignment with existing operational 
practices and technological change. 
Service doctrines of the Indian armed forces today, still tend to be 
either insensitive to technological change or see it as a goal to be attained 
and integrated for military operations. This is especially true for the IA, 
which has a fairly exaggerated view of AI’s impact. Take specifically the 
Indian Army’s Land Warfare Doctrine (IALWD) which states: “The Indian 
Army will continue to modernise to fight in a techno-centric combat 
environment which is likely to emerge in futuristic conflict scenarios due 
to revolution in key technologies like Artificial Intelligence….”8
This statement does not do adequate justice to the IA’s own 
contemporary operational practice and past AI-related technological use. 
Indeed, the IA already deploys UAVs which are a partial form of AI. The 
notion AI is ‘likely’ to emerge in ‘techno-centric environments’ nor is AI 
‘revolutionary’ because it has been around in some form for many decades 
illustrating the weaknesses of IA’s doctrinal articulation on emerging 
technologies. Indeed, it is not a revolutionary, but an evolutionary 
technology. Yet this conceptual muddle is the primary source of the 
problem for the IALWD. In this regard, the IA more specifically is laggard 
in laying out what AI-related capabilities actually exist and what AI could 
do in the future. Indeed, one serving officer even went so far as to say 
recently “One can argue that the use of AI and other niche technologies 
by the Indian Army is only inevitable….”9 This statement again is partly 
illustrative of the problems of the IA’s officer corps assessment of AI. It 
is partially inaccurate given it conceives of AI as an ideal or the promising 
technology that is yet to be grasped. Further, it also ignores the historical 
and contemporary record of semi-autonomous systems that have been in 
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use in some form for decades by the IA and the other services. The only 
issue is and for that reason the above statement is accurate is the extent 
to which AI and especially its sub-fields such as Machine Learning (ML) 
have been applied to defence systems, logistics, personnel management 
and so on in the IA and across the Indian military as well as the extent 
of its penetration. Semi-autonomous weapons are partly AI-driven and 
some non-lethal military platforms are also semi-autonomous. 
The other two Indian armed service doctrines especially the IAF 
doctrine10 does recognise both the strengths and limitations of AI-related 
or autonomous platforms, but the IAF does not define them as AI or see 
the importance of AI as a ‘revolutionary’ technology as the IA’s LWD for 
operations and missions. Indeed, the IAF’s doctrine does not even use 
the term AI or even use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) but describes 
them as Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs). To that extent, the IAF at 
least appears to have the most realistic appraisal semi-AI-based platforms 
such as UAVs can and cannot do.11 IAF RPAs are geared for Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions. These RPAs or partial 
AI capabilities in its inventory are confined to sensing missions, rather 
than for lethal missions or delivery of ordinance. 
Whereas the maritime doctrine of the IN12 does not mention, let 
alone discuss emerging technologies such as AI and unmanned or 
autonomous platforms and their influence on operations and military 
strategy. Although both the IAF and IN do not mention AI within their 
doctrines, let alone define AI rigorously, both services have been using 
AI-related capabilities for many years. Indeed, all three services are 
working fairly intensively to acquire and integrate them for a wider range 
of missions and applications. To that extent, the IALWD goes farther 
than the other two services in acknowledging the growing application 
of AI. Beyond individual service doctrines, what do we make of the tri-
service doctrine? Does it acknowledge the importance of autonomous 
systems? The tri-service doctrine also suffers from the same lacuna. 












Thus, none of the doctrines remotely go far enough in aligning existing 
AI capabilities with their doctrinal pronouncements. All the doctrines 
of the Indian armed services display indifference, misunderstanding of 
AI’s promise for warfare and at one level historical amnesia about the 
use of AI-related technologies in some capacity by the Indian armed 
services. 
Capabilities or their synonym military technologies fall into two 
categories. One is an elaborate support system focused on logistics. 
Take the case of Helmuth J. Moltke, the Prussian Chief of Staff ’s 
design and integration of a complex logistics support system to mobilise 
and transport troops and equipment that enabled Pr ssian military 
strength to be projected over vast distances.13 Nevertheless, there are 
examples of AI’s application from more recent military experience in 
the domain of logistics such as in the run-up to the first gulf war of 
1991. The Dynamic Analysis and Re-Planning Tool (DART) is a case 
in example. It is widely considered a significant breakthrough in AI 
application for military logistics.14 DART helped plan through an AI-
based decision support system by enabling humans to better transport 
military equipment from Europe to Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert 
Shield.15 
The others are centred on technologies such as heavy machine guns 
and artillery systems that are geared for lethal application. Although, 
our focus is primarily on the latter (including sensors) in the subsequent 
analysis, however, both are equally necessary for successful military 
outcomes. Some of the most promising AI technologies thus far have 
been in the sensor domain and weapons lethality. Sensing and lethal 
AI technologies encompass Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), whose 
variants can be deployed for surveillance and reconnaissance missions as 
well as for mission involving the application of lethal firepower.16 Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons (LAWs) for instance use AI. 
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Brief History of Indian Armed Services’ Early Use of 
Semi-Autonomous Systems
The most visible manifestation or operational role of AI in the IA were 
target drones. The most well-known early drone was the KD2R5 target 
drone built and supplied by Northrop Grumman to the IA in the early 
1970s.17 Also known as the Northrop KD2R5 “Sheldruck” was among the 
first examples actually of a rudimentary form of AI, in that it was unpiloted 
used as target for anti-aircraft gunnery. It was subsequently used as target 
training practice for the IA’s earliest Air Defence missile systems built by 
the British—The Tigercat.18 The KD2R5 was equipped with a parachute 
recovery system and flew on autopilot with radio control.19 Other American 
built systems included Northrop Grumman’s Chukar II and Chukar III 
Tactical Expendable Drone Systems (TEDS) which were respectively 
fielded by the IAF and the IN. Chukar II also known as the MQM-74C 
was primarily built for the United States Navy (USN), but was exported to 
several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as non-NATO 
states such as India. The Chukar II was recoverable by parachute and 
when deployed remotely commanded or automatically especially when the 
command link suffered damage.20 Its variant the Chukar III was operated 
or used as an aerial target for anti-aircraft gunnery and for missile training.21 
There were other variants of the MQM-74 TEDS, it is unlikely or at least 
there is little extant evidence to suggest they were used by the Indian 
armed services specifically. Nevertheless, the Shuldruck and Chukar series 
of target drones clearly stand as early examples of the Indian armed services 
use of autonomous or semi-autonomous platforms. In subsequent years’ 
American arms sales restrictions against India meant that there was very 
little defence cooperation that involved the supply of such systems.22 Over 
the last two and half decades India has sourced autonomous systems from 
overseas vendors and started building its own systems. Let us now turn 
to the autonomous systems by each service branch of the Indian military. 
Readers should be cautioned in advance that the empirical evidence 












furnished in the succeeding sections is not exhaustive, because of reasons 
space, the author has confined the list to a small subset of cases. 
Indian Army and the use of Semi-Autonomous Systems
Since the mid-1990s, the Israelis have been the primary source of most of 
India’s UAV systems and these unmanned platforms are geared for ISR 
and target acquisition missions.23 The IA initially acquired the Searcher I 
and Searcher II from Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) Limited and thereafter 
received the Israeli built Heron UAVs and has extensively used them.24 
It is the IA that was initially at the forefront of inducting UAVs into the 
service.25 The Heron UAVs in the mountainous terrain of Jammu and 
Kashmir (J&K) as well as the Thar Desert in Rajasthan for surveillance 
missions. Exercise Sindhu Sudarshan or also known as Sudharshan Shakti 
which is a joint military exercise regularly conducted in the Thar Desert 
involving the IA and IAF since at least the early 2010s have involved the 
extensive of use UAVs.26 Thus the AI used in the IA is largely confined to 
UAVs and most of it dedicated to ISR or sensing missions. In addition, 
the IA is also using UAVs to meet the “communications” requirements 
of the service in the areas of post-disaster medical evacuations and rescue 
operations.27 There are efforts underway to incorporate several other 
types of UAVs. These consist of man-portable micro and mini-spy UAVs 
that can help with surveillance, direct and deliver artillery fire.28 The IA is 
working on integrating UAVs for the infantry and the mechanised infantry 
units.29 The service recently concluded a US$ 20 million contract with 
IdeaForge for the supply of an unknown number of drones directed ISR 
missions in demanding weather and harsh environmental conditions.30 As 
of today, the IA primarily deploys and operates the Israeli built Searcher 
Mark I, Searcher Mark II and the Heron UAVs. All of the IA’ UAVs are 
semi-autonomous in that they are not operated independently any human 
involvement or without any human loop. Nevertheless, they are built on 
AI technology and perform tasks and missions that are AI-driven. 
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In addition, there are efforts underway since at least 2016 to build 
an indigenous Tactical Communications Systems (TCS) by two Domestic 
Agencies (DAs). Each of these DAs are expected to build a prototype 
TCS over an 18-month period. Following development over 18 months, 
each of the TCS prototypes are to undergo technical evaluations by the 
IA.31 The TCS, if and when validated for production and integration will 
help will generate 4G communication at 100 Mbps. In order to secure 
the network, the Defence Research and Development Organisation 
(DRDO)’ Center for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics (CAIR) has 
been tasked with developing a native security solution to ensure network 
security.32 Beyond UAVs, which are the most visible manifestation of 
using AI or semi-AI technology, the IA already uses the Daksha Remotely 
Operated Vehicle (ROV) for ordinance or bomb disposal built by the 
Research and Development Establishment (R&DE).33 These ROVs have 
been operational at least since 2012. Bomb disposal units of the IA as well 
Indian paramilitary forces and Jammu and Kashmir police have also been 
using indigenously ROVs for nearly a decade. The IA has even sought 
under the “Make” category of the Defence Procurement Procedure 
(DPP) a Robotics Surveillance Platform (RSP) which is an AI-related or 
robotics system that is remotely operated to improve ground-based sensing 
system for detecting and tracking the movement of militants in built-up 
urban areas during Counter-Insurgency Operations (CIO).34 The IA is 
also leasing for three years four MALE Heron surveillance drones from 
Israel to expand surveillance capabilities along the Line of Actual Control 
(LaC) with China.35 Two of them are due for delivery in August 2021.36 
Beyond UAV and UCAV imports predominantly from Israel, there are 
native efforts as part of the DRDO’s Research and Development (R&D) 
agenda to develop UCAVs such as the MALE UCAV the Rustom.37 
The latter has been under development for years. Following trials and 
validation, the IA at least hopes to deploy the Rustom or other UCAVs 
for each of its artillery brigades. In addition, the service expects to have 












Loitering Missile Battery Systems and their associated ground segments 
for each Corps.
The foregoing is only a brief overview of AI’s presence in aiding 
sensors and growing efforts on the part of the IA to adapt and integrate 
AI into weapons platforms for combat missions. Let us now turn to the 
IAF’ efforts to integrate and deploy AI-related capabilities. 
Indian Air Force and the use of Semi-Autonomous Systems
The IAF operates an estimated five squadrons of UAVs.38 Although the 
precise number still remains classified.39 These UAV platforms are a mixture 
of Searcher II Heron for ISR missions. The IAF has expressed interest in 
operating Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAVs) placing orders for 
the Harpy and Harop which are both built by Israel Aerospace Industries 
(IAI) and developed for lethal missions such as detection, tracking, 
attacking and destroying enemy’s radar emitters and for Suppression of 
Enemy Air Defences (SEAD).40 The IAF has also sought to re-design 
the Heron and Searchers in its existing inventory of UCAVs by testing 
additional capabilities and features. These include giving the Heron and 
Searchers to detect, attack and destroy the enemy’s radar emission devices 
as well as SEAD capabilities. Extending and using UAVs to combat to 
perform lethal missions like several countries especially the United States, 
Israel, Russia and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is unsurprising. 
After all, India is proceeding with the purchase of 30 Predator B drones for 
3 billion USD from US-based General Atomics.41 The Predator-B UAVs 
are geared for lethal operations which following will give a confirmed 
remotely piloted autonomous capability for lethal missions. The IAF will 
also induct on lease the Heron TP which is a Medium Altitude Long 
Endurance (MALE) UAV that can carry out surveillance missions and 
deliver missile payloads. The Hindustan Aeronautical Limited (HAL) has 
concluded an agreement with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) Limited, 
to build the Heron TP UAV at HAL’s facilities.42 Thus, the IAF should 
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have UCAVs within the inventory in the not too distant future. The IAF 
for its part is moving or has proposed to develop a separate cadre to staff 
and execute UAV operations. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the 
Indian government have yet to sign off on a cadre specific UAV force.43 
Indian Navy and the use of Semi-Autonomous Systems 
The Indian Navy has been a leader in operating UAVs. UAVs have 
been involved in maritime surveillance, traffic control and anti-piracy 
operations and the defence of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). As of 
today, the IN’s fleet air arm has three UAV squadrons which are geared 
for ISR missions.44 An additional UAV squadron consisting of Searcher 
II and Heron UAVs was established in Behala in West Bengal to track 
Chinese submarine movements in the Bay of Bengal and intrusions into 
India’s EEZ.45 The entirety of India’s UAV squadrons are land-based and 
each of them are operated by their respective command headquarters. In 
addition, in order to execute carrier-based missions, the IN is working 
intensively to integrate UAVs that are ship-based and rotorised that meet 
the requirements of higher endurance and payload carrying capacities. 
These UAV’s will have Over-the-Horizon (OTH) carrying capacities, 
battle damage assessment capabilities and communications capabilities.46 
There is also a proposal pending before the Indian government to acquire 
10 ship-based drones to enhance the ISR missions against enemy navy 
vessels.47 The IN like he other services is also considering the induction of 
combat UAVs. Beyond UAVs’ the IN’s Weapons and Electronics Systems 
Engineering Establishment (WESEE) has been involved in “interfacing 
Russian equipment with Western data” as well as the reverse.48 For 
instance, WESEE was responsible for ensuring Russian missiles could 
understand and accept the inputs and commands of German Anshutz 
gyros for navigation.49 This involved a form of automation. WESEE was 
the first entity in India to recognize that fairly obsolete computers could 
be used for converting Western data and made usable by Russian weapons 












in the IN. Although not all of WESEE’s native efforts were successful, 
but it was a harbinger of change for interfacing. In 2019, the IN under 
the aegis of WESEE invited bids to set up an AI and ML laboratory for 
its Combat Management System (CMS).50 The purpose of the bid is to 
set up infrastructure and train personnel on-site for a period of 4 months. 
This does suggest that the IN leadership is alive to the importance of AI 
and ML. 
Assessing the State of AI in India and Military Doctrines
In the foregoing, we have briefly, but not exhaustively reviewed the use 
of AI-related or partially AI-driven capabilities deployed or planned. All 
the operational UAVs in the three service branches of the Indian military 
are remotely piloted and the ground-based robotic systems for bomb 
disposal are also remotely operated by humans. India armed services use 
semi-autonomous airborne systems overwhelmingly for sensing missions. 
In a nutshell, the Indian armed services have primarily or overwhelmingly 
used and deploy are semi-autonomous systems. The armed services and 
more generally the Indian defence establishment’s investments in purely 
autonomous systems that are strongly AI-driven have hardly matched that 
of the advanced industrialised states such as the USA, Japan, Europe and 
China. As Lieutenant General R.S. Panwar observed: “In India, however, 
the power of AI has hardly been exploited in defence applications, be 
it weapons systems, surveillance applications, decis n support systems, 
big data analytics, etc. Existing rob tic systems deployed for defusing 
landmines and other explosive devices have limited autonomy, and do not 
have a strong AI component”.51 
Existing platforms of all the three armed services that use AI are 
essentially semi-autonomous. Thus the cognitive exertion on the part 
of soldiers or personnel for the use and operation of existing defence 
systems across the services is still greater. Amidst all the promise of AI, 
existing service doctrines have not fully acknowledged the actual use of 
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AI even in its partial form. This is where a gap has developed between 
what has “emerged” and what is “emerging” in the area of AI and its 
subfields. Their applicability and limits, as one former senior IA officer 
recognised, such as ML, Deep Learning (DL), Augmented Reality (AR), 
Virtual Reality (VR) and Deep Fakes, Big Data and so on have yet to 
be fully understood and determined.52 Consequently, it is reasonable to 
assume and infer the services have ended up producing doctrines that are 
muddled interpretations of AI. In the case of JDIAS, the mere mention 
of AI is visibly absent. 
Should we single out the Indian armed services for criticism for the 
failure define terms rigorously, draw clear distinction between autonomous 
and semi-autonomous platforms and weapons system and capture with 
greater clarity technological change? In part, this may valid. After all 
India’s leadership set out to release the country’s nuclear doctrine long 
after it actually started surreptitiously improving weapons and acquired 
a “nonweaponised” nuclear capability in 1989-1990 and also continued 
to test missile systems.53 Indeed, a Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) did 
not become publicly available until 1999 following the Pokhran nuclear 
tests of 1998.54 Eventually, an official nuclear doctrine was released in 
2003 and stands as a vivid example in that some capabilities were acquired 
before doctrinal principles were officially articulated and released publicly 
about the use and non-use of nuclear weapons.55 Thus, this is not a unique 
experience for the Indian armed services as the Indian nuclear doctrine 
offers a historical precedent and parallel. 
Nevertheless, each of the services needs to pay more attention to 
updating service doctrines as well as the tri-service doctrine. As tri-service 
cooperation grows and integrated commands crystallise there will be 
a greater need and imperative to harmonise the operational practices, 
missions and technological changes with doctrinal pronouncements of 
the armed forces. 













It is fairly obvious from the foregoing, India’s armed services have 
struggled to bridge the divide between doctrine and technology. Updating 
doctrine through periodic reviews is a mandatory requirement for all 
three armed services. Understanding the strengths and limits of emerging 
technologies such as AI is also essential. Service doctrines require constant 
engagement with emerging technologies, but as tri-service cooperation 
has increased the JDIAS needs to better capture, understand and layout 
the applicability to military missions, operations, command and control, 
logistics and weapons systems. Semi-autonomous platforms have been 
used extensively by the Indian armed services and thus, AI has undergone 
some form of diffusion and use. The Indian armed services are unique: 
AI-related capabilities are being integrated and developed or in use, even 
as doctrine has been laggard in capturing shifts in the adoption of AI. The 
Indian military leadership writ large and the large mass of retired officers 
from the three services recognise the importance of AI. However, service 
doctrines either misconstrue AI significance and in other instances do not 
provide adequate guidance to military commanders and the officer corps 
more generally about technological change that AI represents.
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